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Abstract
Sophisticated voters assess incumbent competence by ltering out economic cycles (which
they do not like) from trend growth (which they do). Naive voters on the other hand respond
only to raw economic growth. This implies that voting in the aggregate should respond
asymmetrically to the economic cycle. Upswings are rewarded by the naive, but punished
by the sophisticated. Downswings are punished by all voters. Using an established dataset
of over 400 general elections we nd that the incumbent vote share a) responds di¤erently
to trend growth than to the cycle, b) does not respond signicantly to positive variation in
the economic cycle, and c) responds signicantly and negatively to negative realizations in
the economic cycle. In contrast to standard formulations of the grievance asymmetrythis
asymmetric vote response is found to be independent of trend growth.
JEL Code: D72
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1 Introduction
In a recent survey of the literature on how election results are linked to economic performance
Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2013) rea¢ rmed Nannestad and Paldams (1994) nding that
the economic vote is "almost always... strong... and statistically signicant." Voters reward
incumbents that deliver strong growth, and punish those that do not. However, despite over
40 years of research, the underlying mechanisms are still not very well understood. Are
voters rationally rewarding competence? Or are they naively responding to unsustainable
pre-electoral booms?
The contribution of this paper is to decompose economic performance into constituent
measures of trend growth and the economic cycle.1 Empirical work to date examining
voting responses to GDP growth has focused almost exclusively on measures reported in
raw terms.2 This is surprising, and we argue mistaken, because separation of the economic
cycle and underlying economic growth, and their respective drivers, is central to much of
modern macroeconomic thinking. Furthermore it seems plausible that voter welfare would
be di¤erently a¤ected by sustainable trend growth and unsustainable booms.3
1The trend and cycle are macroeconomic performance measures; hence, this paper is consistent with
literature emphasizing sociotropiceconomic voting (though it is quite feasible that changes in the trend
and cyclical components of GDP translate into pocketbooke¤ects).
2One important exception is Palmer and Whitten (1999), who decompose macroeconomic data into
expected and unexpected components. These are quite distinct from trend and cycle. For example, the
economic cycle displays a lot of persistence - a recession in one quarter predicts recession in the next
(and hence would be expected). Another approach, taken by Leigh (2009) and Kayser and Peress (2012),
decomposes GDP into national and global elements in order to benchmark national performance.
3Note also that the duration of economic and electoral cycles are of the same order of magnitude. For the
United States, Burns and Mitchell (1946) found that business cycle duration ranged from 6 to 34 quarters
and more recently the National Bureau of Economic Research registered 7 postwar business cycles with a
minimum duration of 6 quarters and a maximum of 43 quarters. (See Everts 2006 for an examination of
these numbers.) These duration statistics compare with electoral cycles usually varying between 3 and 5
years.
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In short-run models of the macroeconomy, the volatility embedded in the economic cycle
reduces welfare.4 Indeed, upswings in the economy - positive values of the output gapas
sometimes dened, typically are modeled to generate as much disutility as downswings -
negative values of the output gap. Therefore policymakers are almost always modeled to
have quadratic disutility in the output gap (e.g., see Clarida, Gali and Gertler 1999).5 In the
context of this paper this means that any unnecessary volatility - downswings and upswings,
when perceived to be the fault of the incumbent, would under rational voting be punished at
the polls. A related criticism is leveled by Alesina and Roubini (1992) against early versions
(e.g., Nordhaus 1975) of the political business cycle. Rational voters should ignore (if not
punish) opportunistically engineered pre-electoral booms as they will be recognized to be
unsustainable (see also Alesina et al., 1999).
The idea that volatility would be unpopular is also explored in Quinn andWoolley (2001).
Indeed they write that "the literature... has been couched in terms of rates of economic
growth alone. The implicit assumption is that citizens have an unqualied preference for
more rather than less growth. A related implicit assumption is that higher growth involves no
signicant costs in terms of economic disruption or volatility." (ibid., p. 636) This concern is
exactly what motivates the present paper. In their empirical work Quinn and Woolley (2001)
nd robust evidence that volatility (measured as the standard deviation of raw growth)
a¤ects the incumbentsvote share negatively, although they do not address the possibility
4One (very plausible) element of this argument is that individuals cannot fully insure themselves against
the vagaries of the economic cycle, and in particular the possibility of unemployment.
5Quadratic utility is not just a mathematical convenience - Woodford (2003) derives it as a second-order
approximation to the utility function (which can take very general form) of a representative agent. In the
New Keynesian literature upswings and downswings both generate dispersion in the distribution of prices in
the economy, given some degree of price rigidity, which changes consumption patterns and is detrimental to
welfare.
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of heterogeneity across individuals in how the vote responds to volatility, or indeed the
asymmetry hypothesis that is proposed here.6
On the other hand it must also be noted that output uctuations may stem from external
shocks such as oil price shocks, global nancial shocks like the recent and ongoing credit
crunch, or indeed "irrational exuberance" in the good times. These are plausibly outside
of the control of policymakers.7 But even here, informed rational voters might still hold
the government responsible for its handling of the cycle. Overall it seems plausible in most
instances that the rational voter would, to some degree at least, hold the incumbent to
account, negatively, for uctuations in the economic cycle.
In contrast, within economics at least, it is close to axiomatic that long-run (trend)
economic growth increases welfare, all else equal.8 Trend growth, by construction, can be
thought of as long-runeconomic growth, and of course there is a huge literature examin-
ing international and temporal variation in this variable and its potential determinants (see
Temple 1999). Moreover the idea that cross-country di¤erences in income per capita are
driven partly by government policy is central to the literature on economic growth. For ex-
ample, Hall and Jones (1999) argue for the fundamental importance of social infrastructure
dened explicitly as "the institutions and government policies that determine the economic
6It should also be acknowledged that GDP (whether expressed in terms of raw or decomposed measures
or volatility) is not the only potential macroeconomic driver of the vote. Carlsen (2000) and Jordahl (2006)
analyze ination and unemployment. However, GDP is certainly the prominent overall measure of macro-
economic performance. For instance, Stigler (1973) writes that "income is a more comprehensive measure
of economic conditions than unemployment". Peltzman (1990) writes that "voters... probably give greater
weight to income growth than to unemployment and ination." Wlezien and Erikson (1996) and Hibbs (2006)
also stress income growth as the primary macroeconomic performance measure.
7Incumbent responsibilityalso undoubtedly varies across institutions and countries. Important advances
here include Powell and Whitten (1993) and Whitten and Palmer (1999).
8This chimes with Peltzmans (1990) argument that only permanent improvements in the voters welfare
should be rewarded.
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environment within which individuals accumulate skills, and rms accumulate capital and
produce output". Empirically, Rodrik et al. (2004) nd that institutional quality "trumps"
other potential determinants of cross-country income levels. Given the wide dispersion in
economic performance it is clear that social infrastructure cannot be taken for granted and
extending this view to a model of rational voting means that improved trend growth will
be rewarded at the polls. Relatedly, Döpke and Pierdzioch (2006) and Fauvelle-Aymar and
Stegmaier (2013) both nd that incumbent approval is related to the stock market over and
above economic control variables. In principle, the stock market index represents market
expectations of the future potential output levels, hence there could be a correspondence
with the trend component of output.
But are voters at all able to separate trend from cycle, when evaluating macroeconomic
performance? On this question we identify two extreme views. The rst, arguably implicit
in the literature to date, is that all voters have no idea whatsoever what is trend and what is
cycle, and cannot begin to disentangle the two. If this is the case, then empirical work should
not identify distinct e¤ects. One of the earliest predictions of the public choice literature
was rational ignorance in voting (see Tullock 1967, 2008). Voters anticipate that their
individual impact on an election will be extremely small, and consequently do not burden
themselves by acquiring costly political and economic knowledge. In its unadulterated form,
rational ignorance suggests that voters will have no knowledge of the macroeconomy at all,
let alone specic knowledge of the trend and cycle.9 To some extent this prediction sits
awkwardly with the stylized fact that there is at least some sort of economic vote, and more
directly with the fact that some voters on some dimensions at least are very well informed.10
9A related consequence is the Downs (1957) paradox of voting.
10In di¤ering contexts, Peltzman (1990) and Gomez and Wilson (2001) nd evidence to support some
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Consequently later theoretical work within the eld has softened. Aidt (2000) discusses some
possible rationales for acquiring such knowledge even accepting the correct premise of a zero
individual e¤ect on the voting outcome. Voters may obtain detailed information through
cues, obtained through the media, or as by-productat zero or very low cost. Alternatively
political and economic information may have intrinsic or consumption value - for example,
by delivering utility via social interaction.
The second is that all voters can perfectly decompose the trend and cycle. This is
unlikely: at any point in time forecasters and commentators may di¤er substantially in their
estimates of trend and cycle, and it is tempting to argue that if experts cannot agree then
the lowly electorate must have no idea at all. The signals by which the electorate gleans
information concerning incumbent competency will therefore not literally take the form of
exact measures of contemporaneous trend and cycle.
The truth is likely to be somewhere in between. In reality there is considerable het-
erogeneity in votersknowledge sets. Blendon et al. (1997) document in the US context
that knowledge of the state of the economy increases with educational attainment. Prior
(2005) also documents a wide degree of political knowledge across the population. Voters
who are interested in politics listen to political arguments over the economy, and this in-
cludes arguments that a government is achieving growth only by stoking up an unsustainable
boom, perhaps inducing unnecessary and visible ination; or that the ination rate has been
brought down only by throwing people out of work. If voters can imperfectly perceive such
cyclical movements, they must also be able to perceive, imperfectly, the trend around which
it revolves. Conover et al. (1986) and Lewis-Beck and Nadeau (2009) both found that voters
degree of sophisticationin the electorate.
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can estimate the unemployment rate quite accurately. Given that the unemployment rate is
highly correlated with the business cycle it follows that voters have a reasonable idea of the
business cycle as well.
In this paper heterogeneous political knowledge is modeled, in the simplest possible way,
by having two types of voters: sophisticated and naive. The sophisticates are dened by the
ability to decompose output into trend and cycle. They like trend growth for the standard
material reasons, whilst they dislike unnecessary volatility around that trend. On the other
hand, naive voters have standard preferences and are interested only in raw output levels at
the time of the election. The rst upshot of this reasoning is that trend growth should be
rewarded at the polls - sophisticated voters like it for its own sake, and given that raw growth
is increasing in trend growth, naive voters also respond positively. The more interesting
hypotheses relate to the cycle. Upswings are rewarded by the naive, but punished by the
sophisticated. Ambiguity therefore arises concerning whether cyclical upticks will increase
incumbentsvote shares. On the other hand, downswings are punished by both sets of voters.
The naive dislike lower output levels, and the sophisticated dislike the volatility. There is no
ambiguity here: downswings should have a strong negative e¤ect on the incumbent voter.
We therefore posit an asymmetric vote response to the economic cycle.
The conception of sophisticationused in this paper di¤ers with alternatives proposed in
the literature. For example, in Gomez and Wilson (2001) low-sophisticatesseek to maxi-
mize proximal consistencyin their beliefs and, hence, are less able to draw connections, and
thus attribute responsibility, between (micro) pocketbook e¤ects and (macro) government
policy decisions. On the other hand, they are more likely to connect (macro) sociotropic con-
sequences with (macro) government decision-making. In contrast, high-sophisticatesseek
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distal consistencyand thus may be able to connect pocketbook consequences with policy de-
cisions, and simultaneously may also recognize disconnect between sociotropic performance
(that is perhaps induced through global forces) and government policy. Empirically, us-
ing micro-data of subjective evaluations of personal and national economic circumstances
Gomez and Wilson nd that sociotropic voting is undi¤erentiated by voter sophistication,
whilst pocketbook voting is predominantly found amongst their sophisticates. Their ap-
proach - which emphasizes heterogeneity in voterscapacities to attribute cause and e¤ect -
is distinct, but of course is not mutually exclusive of that proposed here - which emphasizes
heterogeneity in voters capacities to process visible information. Here all agents witness
GDP. The sophisticates recognize the di¤erence between growth and unnecessary volatility,
whilst the naive do not.
Also relatedly, Zaller (2004) nds that independent/oating voters are both less sophis-
ticated in the sense of exhibiting less political knowledge yet more inclined to vote with the
economy. Sophisticated (politically knowledgeable) voters tend to be more partisan and in-
ured to economic circumstances. This is potentially problematic for our argument, because
the dependent variable here is the aggregate vote; any variation hence necessarily must come
from voters whose allegiances change - independent voters. One way of reconciling Zallers
ndings with the arguments of this paper would be to distinguish between economic sophis-
tication (where one can distinguish trend from cycle) from political sophistication (where
one demonstrates general knowledge of politics and current a¤airs). Even taking as given
that independent voters are generally politically less knowledgeable, they may yet within
themselves respond heterogeneously to the economy.
Our empirical analysis provides strong support for the cyclical asymmetry hypothesis
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proposed in this paper. Using the large dataset of general elections provided by Hellwig and
Samuels (2007) - covering 75 countries between 1975 and 2002 - we nd that trend growth
positively impacts the incumbent vote share as anticipated, and that the impact of the cycle
is indeed asymmetric. The results are consistent with a reasonable degree of sophistication
in the electorate because the vote response to positive values in the cycle is slightly negative
(though the magnitude of this estimated e¤ect is small and is statistically insignicant.)
A one standard deviation boomis estimated to result in a vote loss to the incumbent of
0.71%. However, the vote response to negative values in the cycle is strongly negative and
statistically signicant. A one standard deviation downswing in the cycle is estimated to
result to a vote loss of 3.56%.
The idea that voters respond asymmetrically to the economy as a whole is not new. The
standard theoretical rationale given is the grievance asymmetry(Nannestad and Paldam
1997). This can arise rstly from asymmetry in the utility function - reductions are argued
to be felt more acutely than gains in terms of utility di¤erences. Alternatively, the salience
of the economy may rise in bad economic times, as the news media devote more air time
to the economy.11 However, on the empirical question of whether or not the vote responds
asymmetrically to raw measures of economic performance, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier (2013)
nd that the literature is mixed.12
In order to test the standard grievance asymmetry against our own model, which does
11Indeed, Soroka (2006) and Singer (2013) nd a strong negative correspondence between the extent to
which voters regard the economy as an important issue in survey data, and the overall performance of the
economy:
12This literature began with Bloom and Price (1975), who found in favor of asymmetry in US congressional
elections. Using international data, Kiewiet (1983) and Lewis-Beck (1988) rejected it. Nannestad and Paldam
(1997) found asymmetry using Danish microdata and Pacek and Radcli¤e (1995) also found an asymmetric
response in emerging economies.
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not rely on asymmetric preferences or media penetration, we split the sample depending on
whether trend growth is higher or lower than the median. The point of doing this is that
downswings in the cycle when trend growth is robust imply a less detrimental economic
outcome in absolute terms. The cyclical downswing is o¤set by strong trend growth. In
contrast, cyclical downswings mean adverse economic consequences in the aggregate when,
by construction, trend growth is slow. The standard grievance asymmetry predicts a stronger
response to cyclical downswings when trend growth is low, because in these circumstances
absolute growth is especially low. In the empirical analysis we nd no variation in the
subsamples split by trend growth. Voters respond asymmetrically to the cycle, to the same
extent when trend growth is high and when it is low.
2 Theory
Mainstream macroeconomic theory decomposes GDP (yt, measured in logarithms at time t)
into
yt =
_
yt + eyt;
where
_
yt is trend and eyt the cyclical component. The latter by construction is centred on zero,
with positive values denoting booms, and negative values denoting output below its potential
trend. Note that eyt < 0 does not by itself technically imply a recession, which typically is
dened as two consecutive quarters of negative absolute growth. If
_
yt is increasing, then this
can o¤set eyt < 0 to prevent a formal recession. As discussed in the introduction the drivers
of these two components are typically argued to be distinct - e.g., see Romer (2012).
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We suppose two types of voter.13 Both are materially motivated, but the sophisticated
group by denition recognize the di¤erence between trend and cycle. These voters like trend
growth, because on average it increases income levels. If some of the responsibility for current
trend growth is attributed to the incumbent, then these voters will ceteris paribus vote for
incumbents delivering strong trend growth.
One possible objection at this point is that trend growth is very slow moving, and cannot
be contemporaneously changed by the government of the day. To counter this we make a
number of observations. Firstly, in the empirical work we document considerable variation
both within and across countries in measured trend growth and note that the measure of
trend growth refers to the year of the election, so in most instances the incumbent will at
least have been in power for some years prior to that date. Secondly, even if policies enacted
today take several years actually to result in stronger growth, the stronger future growth
will itself increase measured trend growth today. The trend is constructed empirically as
a smoothed average and so if output increases are manifest in the future, current trend
output will reect this. Third, it seems plausible that politics matters. In most countries
governments are important in providing the basis for (or indeed retarding of) investment and
factor accumulation. For example, it could be that Ronald Reagan was re-elected, because of
his tax-cutting and anti-inationary economic policy, whilst Bill Clinton was re-elected, for
supporting the North American Free Trade Agreement. Both of these specic examples con-
ceivably improved the capacity of the economy in the future, and would thus have increased
trend growth by the point of the relevant re-election date. Indeed one alternative (and by no
means mutually exclusive) way of framing our argument is that on the groundpolicies such
13One could equally imagine a continuum of voters, di¤erentiated by their political knowledge.
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as these are visible, interpreted and evaluated by the electorate. When evaluated overall
as positive then these policies will translate into votes. If the assessment also is at least to
some extent more predisposed to be correct than incorrect, then trend growth, measured ex
post, can be understood as a proxy for good policy visible on the ground, at least to the
sophisticated part of the electorate.
However, if responsibility for current trend growth is deemed hard to assign - for example,
voters attribute its position as resulting from exogenous processes alone, then the upshot of
this would be that one would not expect sophisticated voters, as we have dened them, to
respond to trend growth.
On the other hand, sophisticated voters dislike the volatility encapsulated in the economic
cycle. Volatility may reduce utility if consumption cannot be smoothed over the cycle. In the
New Keynesian macroeconomics literature, both positive and negative output gaps engender
price dispersion which change consumption patterns from their ideal, reducing utility. Al-
ternatively, excessive volatility may just increase uncertainty in the economy, which in turn
could suppress investment. Sophisticated voters may thus punish articial pre-electoral
booms for unnecessarily increasing volatility in the economy. In di¤erent contexts they may
also punish incumbents for failing to curtail excessive volatility when originating from ex-
ogenous processes. Again, as long as there is some responsibility for the cycle attributed
to the incumbent, then these voters will ceteris paribus vote against incumbents associated
with larger absolute cycles and hence, greater volatility.
In contrast, the naivegroup only responds to raw GDP. Regardless of whether or not the
growth is induced by sustainable trend or unsustainable boom these voters reward immediate
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material gain.14
This very simple set-up delivers immediately interesting and novel hypotheses that have
not to date been investigated.
Firstly, trend growth should have an unambiguous positive impact on the vote. Sophis-
ticated voters like trend growth as described and, given that at least some responsibility for
improved trend growth is attributed to the incumbent, then strong trend growth increases
the incumbent vote share. Furthermore, given independence between
_
yt and eyt, then naive
voters also will respond positively, because higher
_
yt implies higher yt. We therefore have
hypothesis 1 (H1):
H1: The incumbent vote will be increasing (reducing) for stronger (weaker) values of
trend growth.
More interestingly, the implications for the cycle are asymmetric. Positive values of eyt
are rewarded by the naive, but punished by the sophisticated. When eyt is positive, then raw
output growth is increased, but the sophisticates recognize this as undesirable, and attribute
some of the responsibility for this volatility to the incumbent. On the other hand, negative
values are punished by both groups of voters. Sophisticates dislike volatility, and the naive
dislike low growth. We therefore have hypotheses 2 (H2) and 3 (H3):
H2: The incumbent vote will respond positively to the economic cycle.
H3: The incumbent vote will respond negatively to the economic cycle in absolute terms.
14An alternative way of modeling the naive voters, leading to the same conclusions, would be to assume
an innite discount rate. One problem that sophisticated voters have with a boom today (i.e., a positive
value for eyt) is that by construction it entails slower growth in the future. If this is discounted completely,
then only yt (i.e., output today) determines the vote.
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H2 encapsulates naivevoting, and by itself predicts a straightforward linear response
to the cycle. Upswings are rewarded and downswings are punished. H3 encapsulates so-
phisticated voting. For sophisticates, any deviation from the trend is undesirable and if
incumbents are held partly responsible for such deviations then they will lose votes. The
implication of H2 and H3 is that the aggregate vote share for the incumbent will be asym-
metric to the cyclical component of output. Theoretically, a stronger response to negative
than to positive cyclical movement will be observed.
3 Empirical Evidence
Ideally, we would have micropolitical data for perceived trend growth and cycles, but to the
best of our knowledge these do not exist. The approach taken here is to use standard decom-
position procedures, and make the assumption that the generated data are representative
of the electorates actual perceptions. It seems likely to us that some voters at least will
have a sense of when growth is below its potential, and whether abnormally high growth is
sustainable or not, for example indirectly by observing other macroeconomic data, such as
ination and unemployment. The data generated from the standard decomposition will at
least be correlated with these perceptions, given the assumption that perceptions on average
are correct.
The starting point for the empirical analysis is Hellwig and Samuels (2007), who use
the total vote share of the incumbent parties in general elections as the dependent variable,
denoted V oteit, where i identies the country and t the election date. This dataset consists
of 424 usable observations - from 75 countries between 1975 and 2002. The dataset is quite
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inclusive - including every national-level executive and legislative election in countries with
a population of one million or more, and receiving a democracy rating of +6 or better on
Polity IVs ranking system. As they document, this dataset is several times larger than used
in previous comparative research.
Annual real GDP per capita data were taken from the World Development Indicators. In
most countries these data begin in 1960 and end in 2012, which overlaps the general election
data by a minimum of 10 years.15 This overlap means that the end-pointproblem associated
with decomposing time-series into trend and cyclical elements is avoided. In order to obtain
measures for economic trend and cycle, these data were transformed into natural logarithms
(yt) and then decomposed using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter.16 ;17 The Hodrick-Prescott
lter estimates the trend (
_
yt) by minimizing
min_
yt
TX
t=1
 
yt  
_
yt
2
+ 
  _
yt+1  
_
yt
   _yt   _yt 12 ;
hence the key element is the parameter . High values put more weight on smoothing ( =1
implies a constant trend growth rate), whilst low values allow the trend to change ( = 0
implies that actual output equals trend output at all times.) Ravn and Uhlig (2002) show
15The earliest usable election in the sample is in 1977 (because the lagged incumbent vote share is a control
variable), and the latest is in 2002. In the small number of instances where WDI series were unavailable, we
took comparable data from the IMFs International Financial Statistics database.
16Transforming the data into logarithims prior to ltering renders the resulting series comparable across
countries.
17An extensive econometric literature exists examining alternative means of decomposing time-series data
into trend and cycle, and alternatives to the HP lter exist. Nonetheless, according to the World Bank, the
HP lter is the most common method used to this end in applied macroeconomic research.
Alternatives such as the Baxter-King (1999) band-pass lter di¤er substantially only at the end-points of
the data. Because the election dates all fall well within the time period for which we have GDP data, no
substantive di¤erences emerge between the cycle estimates of the alternative lters. Using the Baxter-King
lter does not change any of the results reported here in any important way.
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that under particular characteristics of the underlying data, the appropriate weight in annual
data (and that used here) is  = 6:25.
Table 1 contains descriptive statistics of the data used in this study, and shows that over
the full sample average trend growth, g_y , in the year of the election, is about 1.8% with
meaningful dispersion around this.18 As observed in the introduction it is possible that some
of this variation may be attributed to good policy, whilst some may well be determined
by exogenous processes outside the control of the policymaker. But on average we would
expect a positive e¤ect on the incumbent vote. Within the sample, trend growth rates
are slightly (though not signicantly) higher in the OECD democracies, and furthermore the
non-OECD sample exhibits somewhat more variation in both the trend and cyclical elements
of macroeconomic performance as would be expected.
TABLE 1 HERE
In a panel regression of g_y on country xed e¤ects and annual time e¤ects the adjusted
R-squared is 0.37 - showing considerable unexplained variation both within and between
countries. Trend growth is of course correlated with conventional raw economic growth
(dened as gy), but Figure 1 below demonstrates that sizeable variation exists between the
trend and raw growth measures. The R-square in a bivariate regression is equal to 0.59,
hence there is also meaningful cyclical variation in the raw data as would be expected. The
HP cyclical component of GDP is denoted by ey; its dispersion is similar to that of g_y . The
18Following Hellwig and Samuels (2007), we used data from the year preceding the election if the election
was held in the rst six months of the year, and data from the year of the election itself if the election was
held in the second half of the year. In principle, it would also of interest to examine how lagged performance
(of both trend and cycle) may impact the vote. Honorable exceptions in this regard include Peltzman (1990)
and Wlezein and Erikson (1996). However, because contemporaneous economic performance measures are
the industry standardin the economic voting literature, we follow suit in order that the results are more
directly comparable.
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average position in the cycle at the time of election is small but positive (less than 20% of
one standard deviation).
FIGURE 1 HERE
It should be noted that the cyclical component of the HP-lter is not random. By
construction it has mean zero, but booms and recessions may last several years and this
sort of persistence is built into the HP-lter. When a country experiences output levels that
are above (below) the weighted long-run average, then ey > (<) 0. In the US in 1982, for
example, the lter produces ey =  3:74%. Furthermore, trend growth at this point in time
was estimated to be quite low historically, though positive at 1:34%.19 Hence, a recession was
declared formally in 1982 because raw output growth was negative. The HP-lter measure
of trend growth in the US increased to 2:35% by the year 2000 (perhaps due to exogenous
technological progress, or domestic policy), at which point the economy was growing much
faster, and ey = 1:60%. The data thus correspond to experience of the economy when it was
known to be respectively underperforming and overheating.
Essentially the HP-lter provides a purely statistical decomposition of the GDP data
into estimated trend and cyclical elements. It must be emphasized that the lter certainly
does not isolate politically induced growth or indeed politically induced cycles. But as noted
in the introduction it is central to modern macroeconomics that trend growth should add
to voter utility whilst cyclical variation will subtract from it. Interpretation of the results
below thus requires two premises. Firstly that some of the electorate at least are able (quite
19Jorgenson et al. (2008) describe the evolution of long-run US productivity growth: it slowed down in
the 1970s and 1980s, and then resurged after around 1995. This characterization is also revealed in the
HP-ltered series for
_
yt.
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possibly imperfectly) to decompose yt into trend and cycle components and, secondly, that
some degree of responsibility for the inferred performance is attributed to the incumbent.
The benchmark for the empirical analysis is Model 1 in Hellwig and Samuels (2007).
In their specication, the dependent variable is the incumbent vote share, and the key
explanatory variable is raw growth (in Hellwig and Samuels 2007 this variable is called
Economy). We replicate their Model 1 in column 1 of Table 2, but using the newly collected
GDP per capita data. The results conrm the original ndings.20 Raw growth has a positive
and statistically signicant e¤ect on the incumbent vote share.
TABLE 2 HERE
In column 2, the raw growth data are decomposed separately into trend and cycle. This
specication presupposes symmetry in response to the cycle, but is of interest as a preliminary
examination of the question of whether or not the trend and cycle a¤ect the vote di¤erently.
As noted above, if all voters are naive, and only raw output matters, then the two elements
should have equal e¤ects on the vote. The results show that the impact of the trend is
estimated to be positive and statistically signicant, with an estimated coe¢ cient quite
close to that estimated for raw growth. In contrast, the coe¢ cient estimate corresponding
to the cycle is about half that of the trend and is not statistically signicant. The takeaway
here would be that the trend is important, whilst the cycle isnt, though of course this
specication ignores the potential asymmetry in the vote response to the cycle.
When the absolute value of the cycle is included as an additional explanatory variable,
in accordance with hypothesis 3 (in column 3 of table 2) the results change as follows. The
20The small (and unimportant) di¤erences between the results in column 1 of Table 2 and Model 1 in
Hellwig and Samuels (2007) can be attributed to data revisions.
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impact of trend growth is still positive, though is now signicant only at the 10% level. More
interestingly, the impact of the cycle is entirely consistent with hypotheses 2 and 3 above.
The coe¢ cient estimate on ey is now positive and signicant at the 5% level. In contrast the
coe¢ cient on the absolute value of the cycle, Abs jeyj, is negative and signicant with a p-value
of 1.1%. Thus, the positive electoral response induced by positive values for ey is cancelled
out by Abs jeyj. In contrast the negative electoral response induced by negative values for ey is
augmented by Abs jeyj. This provides strong support for the asymmetry hypothesis advanced
above. Because the coe¢ cient estimate for Abs jeyj is greater in absolute terms than that for
ey, even positive uctuations in the cycle are estimated to be detrimental to votes. Using
these parameter estimates, a one standard deviation boom (ey = 1:888) is estimated to
result in a 0.71% vote loss for incumbents. Conversely a one standard deviation growth
recession(ey =  1:888) is estimated to result to a vote loss of 3.56%. Output uctuations
are to be avoided - but most especially negative values.21
In column (4), the two interaction control variables, which constitute the specic research
agenda explored in Hellwig and Samuels (2007), are dropped. The resulting specication is
thus more representative of standard vote regressions. The ndings are unaltered: ey induces a
signicant and positive vote response, whilst Abs jeyj induces a larger negative vote response.
Similarly, column (5) contains results when GDP per capita is dropped (which may be
collinear with the key explanatory variables). Again the results are unaltered qualitatively.
Our interpretation of these ndings is that the electorate is heterogenous in its knowledge
of the economy. A meaningful fraction has some degree of sophistication, and dislikes output
gaps of any sort. Another sizable part of the electorate doesnt recognize the economic
21These results are entirely consistent with Quinn and Woolley (2001), who nd an unconditional negative
e¤ect of volatility on the incumbent vote. On average, any volatility is bad for the incumbent.
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cycle, but is nonetheless motivated by raw GDP. These voters reward upswings and punish
downswings. There is no evidence at all for an electoral reward to a cyclical boom. There is
considerable evidence that voters punish negative values of the cycle.
The standard rationale given for possible asymmetry in the economic vote is the griev-
ance asymmetry. Column (6) reports results for the standard asymmetry hypothesis by
separately including regressors for raw growth, gy, and the absolute value of raw growth,
Abs jgyj. If the standard grievance asymmetry is correct, then a negative sign on Abs jgyj
should be returned: positive growth should yield a smaller vote gain (the negative e¤ect of
e¤ect of Abs jgyj o¤sets the positive e¤ect of gy), whilst negative growth should result in
a larger vote loss (the negative e¤ect of Abs jgyj augments the negative e¤ect of gy). The
results show that the estimated coe¢ cient for Abs jgyj is negative as anticipated, but not
statistically signicant. Consistent with the literature summarized in Table 2 of Lewis-Beck
and Stegmaier (2013), the estimated results here at best support this view only weakly.
The grievance asymmetryapplies to the economy as measured in raw terms. Voters are
more aggrieved in recessions than in booms. The mechanism could be issue saliency - as
bad newsis reported to a fuller extent than good news, or it could straightforwardly be
asymmetry in the utility function. In order to test this explanation against ours, we split
the sample in two, depending on whether trend growth is above or below its median value of
1.8%. The point here is that when trend growth is low, negative values for ey will to a greater
extent imply recession, which is dened in terms of negative growth in actual (raw) output.
When trend growth is high, this will cancel out negative values for ey in the aggregate, and
voters will be less aggrieved. If the grievance asymmetry is correct, we would expect to see
that the economy, especially Abs jeyj, would be a stronger (negative) determinant of the vote
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when trend growth is low. If voters instead divide into naive and sophisticated, with only
the latter disliking volatility, then we would expect to see no change in the impact of Abs jeyj
on the incumbent vote share.22
Columns (7) and (8) of Table 2 repeat column (3), respectively for the low and high trend
growth samples. When trend growth is low (column 7) the parameter estimates for ey and
Abs jeyj are again respectively positive and negative, with lesser signicance relative to the
full sample. When trend growth is high (column 8), if anything the sensitivity to recessions
(embodied in the estimate for Abs jeyj) is strengthened - contrary to the grievance/saliency
argument. Negative uctuations in ey are if anything punished to a greater extent when
trend growth is high than when it is low, although the di¤erences in the cyclical parameter
estimates for columns (7) and (8) are not statistically signicant.
The nding that the asymmetric electoral response to the economic cycle is essentially
independent of the prevailing level of trend growth sits awkwardly with the grievance asym-
metry. It is hard to imagine that voters will be equally aggrieved when the cycle is 2% below
trend growth of 4% than when it is 2% below 0%. However, this nding is quite consistent
with the argument proposed here, that voters are heterogenous, and respond di¤erentially
to the economic cycle.
4 Conclusion
This paper examines how decomposed GDP data a¤ect the incumbent vote share in general
elections. Following mainstream macroeconomic theory, trend growth and the cycle are ar-
22We are implicitly assuming that the degree of sophistication of the electorate does not correlate with
the economic cycle.
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gued to have di¤erent drivers, and a¤ect voter welfare di¤erently. Voters are modeled to be
heterogenous in their knowledge of the state of the economy. The sophisticated separately
observe both, whilst the naive only observe raw growth - the aggregate of the two. The
sophisticated like trend growth, but dislike the volatility associated with any deviation from
trend - be it positive or negative. The naive just plainly like raw growth. This very simple
set up generates an asymmetry hypothesis. The incumbent vote share should respond more
strongly to cyclical downswings than it should to upswings. In the former case the sophisti-
cated and the naive are aligned in their disapproval of incumbents, whilst in the latter they
are conicted.
Using an established and inclusive dataset we nd strong evidence in favor of an asym-
metric vote response to the economic cycle. Upswings yield nothing, at least in terms of
statistical signicance. Downswings are punished signicantly at the polls. This relationship
holds equally at high levels of trend growth and low, in contrast to more familiar conceptions
of the grievance asymmetry.
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Variable mean std. dev.
(all) (OECD) (non-OECD) (all) (OECD) (non-OECD)
V ote 34:36 35:33 33:60 14:77 11:99 16:63
gy 1:887 2:209 1:628 3:173 1:952 3:871
g_y 1:810 2:077 1:595 2:044 1:205 2:506ey 0:337 0:041 0:574 1:888 1:310 2:222
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics. V ote is the total incumbent vote share. gy is raw economic
growth in the year of the election (or the preceding year if the election takes place in the
rst half of the year). g_y denotes trend growth, and ey denotes the HP cyclical component
of GDP.
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